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Abstract This paper presents a novel Coprime Blurred
Pair (CBP) model for visual data-hiding for security in
camera surveillance. While most previous approaches
have focused on completely encrypting the video stream,
we introduce a spatial encryption scheme by blurring
the image/video contents to create a CBP. Our goal
is to obscure detail in public video streams by blur-
ring while allowing behavior to be recognized and to
quickly deblur the stream so that details are available
if behavior is recognized as suspicious. We create a CBP
by blurring the same latent image with two unknown
kernels. The two kernels are coprime when mapped to
bivariate polynomials in the z domain. To deblur the
CBP we first use the coprime constraint to approximate
the kernels and sample the bivariate CBP polynomials
in one dimension on the unit circle. At each sample
point, we factor the 1D polynomial pair and compose
the results into a 2D kernel matrix. Finally, we compute
the inverse Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the kernel
matrices to recover the coprime kernels and then the la-
tent video stream. It is therefore only possible to deblur
the video stream if a user has access to both streams.
To improve the practicability of our algorithm, we im-
plement our algorithm using a graphics processing unit
(GPU) to decrypt the blurred video streams in real-
time, and extensive experimental results demonstrate
that our new scheme can effectively protect sensitive
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identity information in surveillance videos and faith-
fully reconstruct the unblurred video stream when two
blurred sequences are available.
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1 Introduction
Video surveillance in public spaces has increased dra-
matically in recent history as a means to deter both
terrorism and crime in urban environments. However,
concern about the potential for abuse and the general
loss of privacy has also grown along with the number
of surveillance cameras. In recent years the problem of
providing visual data in sensitive environments with-
out impinging on the privacy of the public has been
a major research topic in machine vision society. The
challenge in protecting surveillance data lies in how to
reduce both the number of personally identifiable fea-
tures and the people with access to these features [4,3,
8].
State-of-the-art information hiding techniques either
rely on cryptography (codes and ciphers) to change the
structure of data or use steganography to render the
message invisible. For visual data, Naor and Shamier
[16] first introduced the notion of visual cryptography.
They also developed a Visual Secret Sharing (VSS)
scheme by dividing the secret image among n partic-
ipants where the image can only be recovered when
a sufficient number of participants stack their respec-
tive pieces together. VSS can effectively protect the
visual data. However, since the data received by each
individual participant has been fully encrypted, it pro-
vides very little usable information. In the case of video
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surveillance, this indicates that the data received by
low-clearance users would be completely useless.
In this paper we present a novel visual data-hiding
technology for data security in video surveillance. Dif-
ferent from previous “complete”encryption schemes, we
introduce a “partial”data encryption scheme by blur-
ring the image/video contents. Our goal is two fold, to
provide anonymity to the public and to limit user ac-
cess to image streams that have less degrees of blurring
or no blurring at all. Our approach makes use of two
blurred image streams each of which suppress the ap-
propriate private attributes while retaining the ability
to reconstruct an unblurred image if one has access to
both image streams simultaneously. Experimental re-
sults show that our new scheme can effectively protect
sensitive identity information in surveillance videos and
reconstruct the original unblurred video stream for peo-
ple with high security clearance.
2 Related Work
Most existing visual data protection schemes fall into
the framework of visual cryptography (VC) first pro-
posed by Naor and Shamir [16]. The main idea is to
partition the data into n pieces called the shares. Only
when sufficient number of shares are stacked together,
will human eyes recognize the image content. To achieve
this goal, the authors superimpose random patterns of
dots onto each share to produce noisy-looking images.
However, the appearance of these noisy images in and
of themselves might lead one to suspect data encryp-
tion. To alleviate this problem, newer schemes such as
halftoning [27,15,23] attempt to separately deal with
grayscale and color channels to minimize the loss in
contrast . They also produce visually pleasing results
for the shares. For example, the work by Zhou et al.
[27] observes that the grayscale component carries the
most significant visual cues and they chose to generate
halftone shares on a second image.
Existing VC solutions, however, are not directly ap-
plicable to privacy-protection in visual surveillance. For
example, classical VC schemes completely hide the im-
age contents from low-clearance users and the encrypted
visual data is completely useless to these users. Ideally,
low-clearance users should still be able to access some
visual information (e.g., the behavior of the target) al-
though their ability for viewing privacy-sensitive details
such as facial features would be constrained. These ob-
servations have led to the notion of “blind vision”for
addressing such privacy issues. Recent efforts include
privacy-protected face detection [1], face recognition [6],
image filtering [9], and image retrieval [21]. Along the
same line of the surveillance work by Yang et al. [4,3,
8] that aim to separately treat privacy vs. non-privacy
features, we present a “partial textquotedblright visual
encryption scheme to allow low-clearance users to par-
tially analyze the visual data without revealing crucial
identity information. A comprehensive study of VC can
be found in [24].
A natural “partial”encryption solution is to strate-
gically blur the imagery data. A blurred image B can
be viewed as the convolution of a latent image L with a
blur kernel K. Tremendous efforts have been focused on
solving the blind image deconvolution problem in which
neither L nor K is known. Since blind deconvolution
is an under-constrained problem, state-of-the-art solu-
tions rely on regularization to avoid trivial solutions [20,
25,22]. Latest approaches attempt to use special priors
such as image statistics [7], edge and gradient distri-
butions [11], kernel sparsity and continuity [5], or color
information [10] for both kernel estimation and image
deconvolution. Despite these advances, robust decon-
volution remains as an open problem in image process-
ing and computer vision [12]. However, because accu-
rate deblurring is inherently difficult it is ideal for par-
tial visual encryption. The blurry video stream protects
identity details while withstanding brute-force deconvo-
lution methods intended to “decrypt”the data.
Our solution is inspired by recently proposed dual-
image deblurring techniques [18,26,5]. These methods
use a pair of images captured towards the same scene
under different aperture/shutter settings. For example,
a blurry/noisy image pair can be captured with differ-
ent shutter speeds. The image pair helps to estimate
the kernel and to reduce the ringing artifacts [26] in
reconstruction. A dual-blur pair [5] captures the scene
under different motion blurs. It then estimates both
blur kernels by constructing an equally blurred image
pair. These methods suggest that the correlation be-
tween the images imposes important constraints that
are useful for kernel and latent image estimations. In
particular, it indicates that a single image/video stream
will be impossible to decrypt (e.g., to a low-clearance
user) but if both streams are available, they will be easy
to decrypt (e.g., to a high-clearance user).
3 Algorithm Overview
Fig. 1 shows the processing pipeline of our data-hiding
technology for data security in video surveillance. We
apply coprime blur kernels to the input surveillance
video sequence to generate two blurry video streams
where all the sensitive information is hidden. One is
the public stream, and the other is the private stream.
The private video sequence is streamed to high clear-
ance personnel through secure transmission lines. Only
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Fig. 1 The processing pipeline of our data-hiding technology for data security in video surveillance.
high clearance personnel has access to both the pri-
vate and public streams. Here kernel coprimality means
when viewing the blur kernels as 2D polynomials, these
2D polynomials are coprime and the degree of their
GCD is 1. By using the coprime blur kernels for sen-
sitive data hiding, we design an efficient and robust
algorithm to faithfully reconstruct the ground truth in-
put sequence for the high clearance personnel. We also
show that by implementing it on GPUs, we can further
improve the computational efficiency of the algorithm
to be real-time on a typical business workstation. This
would make our data-hiding technology practical for
everyday surveillance environments.
Blur Kernel Selection: The manner in which the
blur kernel is implemented in our system is important
because it impacts the security of the system and the
privacy due to the blurring. The key is to use very large
blur kernels when compared to the size of the input im-
age sequence. The larger the kernel size, the more un-
known variables there are to solve in an inverse prob-
lem, and thus the harder it is to decrypt the surveil-
lance video. We therefore randomly construct the blur
kernels of large size, and use different kernels for each
new frame in the stream. The end users need not to
know when the blur kernel has changed because they
have no means of deblurring the image with only one
image. Users with access to both image streams also
need not to know when a blur kernel changes or even
the blur kernel itself because the deblurring processes
simply relies on possessing two images simultaneously.
However, changing the blur kernel frequently may affect
the temporal coherence of the blurred regions and could
result in distracting flickering of the blurred regions.
Multi-level Security: The coprime blur scheme
described constructs two blurred video streams. One
video stream is publicly accessible but access to the sec-
ond stream is restricted to users with high clearance and
is effectively private. Our scheme is therefore charac-
terized by a public/private encryption/decryption pair.
Either of the blur kernel can act as a public encryption
key whereas both blur encrypted blur streams act as
a private key and as a result restricting access to both
streams is paramount. Our approach can be extended
to implement a scheme that has more than two levels of
security. We do this by dividing the users with access to
the private video stream into levels. We restrict a level’s
access to the latent image by reducing the precision of
the bits representing incoming blurred frames. For in-
stance users with the highest access will have full bit
resolution while others with lower clearance will not be
able to access some subset of the least significant bits.
Restricting access to the least significant bits of a pixel
will therefore degrade the quality of the latent image
reconstruction.
be more prudent to first blur the input with one
coprime blur pair and use the resulting public video
stream as the input to the second coprime blur pair.
This second blur pair can be safely distributed in unse-
cured environments while knowing that the maximum
level of recoverable detail is limited by the blur of the
first coprime blur public video stream.
4 Coprime Deblurring
An image can be viewed as a bivariate polynomial with
powers of x and y indicating horizontal and vertical
positions and pixel values as coefficients. Some blurring
operations then take the form of polynomial multipli-
cation or convolution: we can model a blurred video
frame B of size M ×N as the convolution of the input
blur-free video frame L hereafter referred to as the la-
tent image with an unknown blur kernel K, plus noise
Ne,
B = L⊗K + Ne, (1)
where ⊗ is the convolution operator. We then apply
the z-transform to both sides of the equation. The z-
transform of the image will have as coefficients the re-
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Fig. 2 GCD computation pipeline.
spective pixel values at each location. It allows the blur-
ring process to be implemented as polynomial multipli-
cation instead of convolution,
b(z1, z2) = l(z1, z2) · k(z1, z2) + ne(z1, z2), (2)
where b,l,k and ne are z-transform of B,L,K and Ne
respectively. The two dimensional z-transform process
can be further simplified by treating it as a pair of one
dimensional transform,
b(z1, z2) = z
T
1 ·B · z2, (3)
where z1 = [1, z1, z
2
1 , . . . , z
M−1
1 ]
T is the z-transform in
one direction, and z2 = [1, z2, z
2
2 , . . . , z
N−1
2 ]
T is the z-
transform in the other.
Our proposed dual blur surveillance blurs the latent
(all-clear) video frame using two coprime blur kernels.
When presented with two motion blurred images of the
same scene B1 and B2 and neglecting the image sensor
noise Ne, we could faithfully reconstruct the latent im-
age L together with the blur kernels K1 and K2 with
respect to each blurred image as:
l(z1, z2) = GCD{b1(z1, z2), b2(z1, z2)}, (4)
where GCD corresponds to the greatest common divisor
of b1 and b2. We also say that k1(z1, z2) and k2(z1, z2)
are cofactors.
Fig.2 shows the details of our coprime deblurring
algorithm. To recover the approximate GCD of b1 and
b2, i.e. the latent image L, we first compute the approx-
imate 2D cofactor k1, and then directly divide the blur
image B1 by the kernel K1 in the Fourier domain, since
our estimated cofactor k1 is numerically stable and ac-
curate. The first step of our algorithm is to estimate the
degree of the blur kernels. Here we assume the blur ker-
nels are all square. We recover the kernel size by analyz-
ing the singularity of the leading principal submatrices
of the Be´zout matrix [2]. We use this kernel degree t in
the second stage for computing the degree of the GCD
and polynomial evaluation around the unit circle. Next
we recover the 2D cofactor k1(z1, z2). Instead of solving
a very large 2D GCD problem, we actually decompose
it into t 1D GCD sub-problems. It not only improves
the computational efficiency dramatically, but also re-
duces the required memory space. Recall that the blur
kernel size in our case is usually much smaller than the
image resolution, therefore, our method is much more
efficient than the conventional method [17] based on
recovering the latent image through GCDs.
In practice, to solve different scaling factors with
regard to each 1D GCD, we run the second step two
times. We evaluate the 2D polynomials b1 and b2 along
the z1 direction first, compute the 1D GCDs, and then
evaluate the 1D GCDs along z2. Alternatively, we do
polynomial evaluation along z2 first and then z1. The
final estimation k1 is the least square estimation of the
two results generated by different polynomial evalua-
tion orders. For technical details of our coprime deblur-
ring algorithm, please refer to [13,14].
5 CUDA Implementation
The software implementation of our coprime deblurring
is composed of five major stages, polynomial evaluation,
kernel degree estimation, 1D cofactor estimation and
2D kernel estimation and inverse FFT. The processing
pipeline is executed primarily on the GPU, however,
some algebraic operations on small matrices such as
SVD are implemented on the CPU. It was found that
for small kernel sizes faster implementations for SVD
exist on the CPU. Kernel degrees above 25 have a very
detrimental impact on the running time and prevent the
algorithm from running in real time. Therefore SVD is
only performed on square matrices of degree no more
than 25 in our implementation. We optimized the eval-
uation of the image polynomials around the unit circle
and the final co-factor evaluations for efficient mem-
ory access. Portions of the processing pipeline which fo-
cused on producing smaller intermediate matrices were
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Fig. 3 CUDA device map for polynomial evaluation. Note
that each thread only performs two multiplications and that
results are written directly into shared memory. After ac-
cumulation of shared memory the result is written back to
device memory.
optimized primarily for maximizing throughput instead
of minimizing the number of memory accesses.
The deblurring process begins with the kernel de-
gree estimation process. In order to estimate the degree
of the kernel, we first evaluate the two image polynomi-
als at points around the unit circle in the z1 direction
or the z2 direction. This process is exactly the N point
Discrete Fourier Transform(DFT). We then choose the
DFT coefficients corresponding to either the z1 or the
z2 direction and construct a Be´zout matrix. It does not
matter which direction’s coefficients are used first as we
assume the blur kernel is square. We determine the de-
gree of the blur kernel by finding the smallest leading
principle submatrix that is non-singular. The general
approach would be to use a binary search on the full
Be´zout matrix to find the smallest non singular sub-
matrix. This approach however initially involves SVD
on matrices too large to result in real time operation
of our algorithm. Therefore, we restrict search to odd
leading submatrices of size at least 9 × 9 and at most
25 × 25. As previously stated small SVD calculations
are done on the CPU as they are better suited to take
advantage of the cache on the CPU. In order to further
speed the kernel degree estimation we use four threads
to perform SVDs on different sized submatrices simul-
taneously. Of the 9 different odd kernels sizes between
9 × 9 and 25 × 25 it never takes more than two SVD
calculations on each given thread to find the kernel de-
gree. If all the Be´zout submatrices are singular then the
kernel degree must be maximal and 25 is chosen as the
kernel degree t.
After determining the degree of the kernel we once
again use the DFT coefficients but this time to com-
pute 1D cofactor estimates. We now discuss our DFT
implementation in greater detail before moving on to
the 1D cofactor estimates. Evaluating the image poly-
nomial in both the z1 and z2 direction required two calls
to our CUDA DFT kernel. Given a t × t kernel there
will be 4t DFT calculations for the input blur pair. In
our implementation, a N point DFT in the z1 direction
on a 640 × 480 frame has 640 thread blocks each with
480 threads. Similarly, in the z2 direction our kernel
has 480 thread blocks and 640 threads per block. We
have designed our DFT sampling kernel such that each
thread only stores three values in the registers at any
given time, as can be seen in Fig. 3. Two of those val-
ues are the normalized intensity values from the same
location in the CBP and the third value is the current
complex sample from the unit circle. For a t× t kernel
there will be N samples of the unit circle in the z1 di-
rection DFT and M different samples of the unit circle
in the z2 direction. Each thread performs two complex
multiplications one for each image and stores the re-
sult in that thread block’s shared memory array. The
shared memory array is then accumulated to produce
the DFT sample for that thread block after which the
next unit circle sample is loaded from global memory
into that register. The philosophy behind this approach
is to ensure that any value used more than once resides
either in a thread’s register or shared memory within a
thread block and is never loaded from global memory
twice.
NVIDIA’s CUDA provides support for the DFT op-
eration via its cufft library. However, it does not provide
good performance for input sizes that are not powers
of two. For some frame sizes it can be impractical to
pad input images to the next power of two consider-
ing the number operations that will be performed on
the padded input. We therefore tailored our algorithm
to provide the best DFT performance for any arbitrary
frame size. Choosing a standard frame size does not
restrict the DFT to that frame size as the level of pri-
vacy desired may increase or decrease the size of the
blur kernel and therefore the resulting frame size. The
number of points in our two 1D DFT sampling stage
is therefore determined after kernel size estimation and
a CUDA kernel function called to produce the correct
unit circle samples.
Having performed the DFT on the image polyno-
mials in the z1 and z2 direction we now begin the 1D
cofactor computation by constructing t Be´zout matri-
ces from z1 and t more Be´zout matrices from the coef-
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ficients in the z2 direction. Similar to the kernel degree
estimation process these Be´zout matrices are copied
back to host memory to be factored by CPU SVD rou-
tines. The resulting 1D kernel cofactors are copied back
to the GPU to be used in the 2D kernel estimation pro-
cess. The GCD deblurring algorithm also has a number
of intermediate processing steps on small matrices or
vectors similar to the Be´zout matrix. Unlike the pre-
viously discussed SVD decomposition these operations
are all O(n) and therefore present significant opportu-
nity for performance gains. We do this by constructing
composite matrices from vectors such as DFT coeffi-
cients and processing them in parallel across different
thread blocks in order to maximize resource usage on
the GPU.
2D kernel estimation continues by evaluating por-
tions of the factored Be´zout matrix on the unit circle
to produce scaled coefficients of the kernel k1’s Fourier
transform. In order to combine the two estimates of k1
we must recover the scaling factors on rows of the first
k1 estimate and the columns of the second k1 estimate.
We therefore have 2t unknowns and t × t elements in
the kernel estimates producing an over determined sys-
tem. We therefore employ a least squares approach and
apply SVD again on the CPU to determine the scale
factors. After normalization of the kernel estimates we
compute the average of the two kernel estimates and use
it to deblur one frame of input blur pair via the inverse
FFT in CUDA’s cufft library. We use CUDA’s FFT im-
plementation because it relies on texture memory and
can store the entire image unlike our DFT evaluation
kernel which is optimized for small number of DFTs.
6 Results and Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate our deblurring scheme
by showing its performance in a number of common
surveillance scenarios. We also present running times
for our implementation for various blur kernel sizes.
We test our algorithm on a PC with a 3.00 Ghz Intel
Quad core CPU, 3 GB memory and a NVIDIA Geforce
GTX460 GPU with compute capability 2.1. Video se-
quences were captured with a Point Grey Flea2 firewire
camera. Our blurring and deblurring algorithms were
implemented using NVIDA CUDA SDK 3.2. All input
frames had a pixel resolution of 640× 480. Blur kernel
sizes varied between 19× 19 and 25× 25 based on the
level of anonymity required for the scene. The effect of
large kernels on the running time of our algorithm was
also evaluated.
In Fig. 4 we show a typical outdoor public surveil-
lance scenario of a sidewalk in an urban area. Note
that the frames blurred with 23× 23 kernels in the top
row still allow the viewer to discern important qualities
about the individual in the frame. Despite not being
able to identify facial features one is still able to ascer-
tain the color and type of clothing being worn. In addi-
tion, one can see that the individual has his hand raised
to his ear and thereby infer that he might be making
a telephone call without necessarily being able to see
the mobile phone. In this way authorities tasked with
surveillance are still able to identify common behavior
without having being presented with a sharp image.
Note also in the bottom row samples of our de-
blurred results for this scene. In the event that greater
scrutiny of the passerby is warranted a high clearance
user would now be able to discern much more about
the target. In addition to confirming that the passerby
was indeed using a mobile phone they could determine
that he was wearing glasses and that his shoes had
white tips. In urban surveillance scenes like this it is
also common for cameras to inadvertently record the
licence plates or passing cars. Notice the right lane of
the street is within the camera’s field of view. Employ-
ing our GCD blurring scheme in these sidewalk/street
scenes would therefore restrict licence plate information
to users with high clearance.
In Fig. 5 we present a parking lot surveillance video
in which two distant individuals are walking towards
the camera. The blur kernel in this series of frames is
19× 19. We compare our deblurring results with those
from the stat-of-the-art blind single image deblurring
[20], and the traditional non-blind Richardson-Lucy de-
convolution [19]. Here non-blind deconvolution means
we provide the ground truth blur kernels for the tradi-
tional Richardson-Lucy algorithm. As can be seen in the
figure, both the blind single image deblurring algorithm
[20] and non-blind Richardson-Lucy deconvolution [19]
cannot recover the sensitive facial information from the
subjects. However, in the second column our GCD de-
blurred frames have a much greater amount of detail
and facial detail in particular. Only in the column pre-
senting our GCD results are the details of the target’s
distant faces discernible.
In Fig. 6 we show a camera monitoring an entrance
a very common indoor surveillance scenario. Because
objects of interest in the scene will be closer to the
camera the size of the blur kernel was increased to 25×
25 so as not to preserve too much detail. In the blurred
frames it is clear that two people enter the building
and what color their clothing is. However, apart from
that it is difficult to discern facial details or even the
gender of the individuals entering the building. In the
deblurred frames on the bottom row it is easy to discern
important details about the individuals such as their
faces and even that there is a car in the background.
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Fig. 4 Deblurring results of a typical surveillance scene in an urban environment.
Table 1 Running times of the pipeline stages with different
kernel size for images of size 640× 480 (in milliseconds)
Pipeline Stage
Kernel Size
9× 9 17× 17 23× 23
Polynomial Evaluation 0.65 0.94 1.39
Kernel Degree Estimation 0.81 0.81 0.83
1D Kernel Estimation 18.45 27.83 35.87
2D Kernel Est. and FFT 4.06 4.82 5.9
Total Time 23.97 34.4 43.99
Performance. Tab. 1 provides running times for
our overall algorithm and component processes with
various kernel sizes. From the total running times it
is evident that our processing pipeline achieves frame
rates that approach or exceed current standard video
frame rates. Running times include the memory copies
of the input frames to the GPU and the memory copy
of the resulting unblurred frame back to host memory.
We measure the running times using calls to NVIDA’s
timer functions. Table 1 shows that of all the process-
ing pipeline stages the 1D kernel estimation is the most
time consuming. This is primarily due that time asso-
ciated with each SVD decomposition and the fact the
number of SVD factorizations grow exponentially with
kernel size. However, other factors related to the con-
struction of a greater number of Bezout matrices, copy-
ing them to host memory and copying the result of the
SVD back to GPU scale in proportion to the number
of SVD factorizations.
Less computationally expensive stages such as poly-
nomial evaluation and kernel degree estimation con-
tribute little to the overall running time of the algo-
rithm. However, the polynomial evaluation running time
increases proportionally with kernel degree t. The run-
ning time of the kernel degree estimation stage remains
essentially constant as the size of the input remains the
same regardless of the blur kernel size. The running
time of the last stage however, increases steadily with
kernel size. This increase is due to the small polynomial
evaluation carried out on the 1D kernel cofactors to pro-
duce the 2D kernel estimate and not to the constant
running time to divide by the kernel and the apply the
the inverse FFT to deblur the image. We also execute
our algorithm on the CPU producing running times of
∼0.509 secs and ∼3.404 secs for 9× 9 and 25× 25 blur
kernels respectively. Running the vast majority of our
algorithm on the GPU therefore produces speedups of
21 and 77 respectively.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated the usefulness of our coprime
blur scheme for visual data hiding in surveillance that
does not rely on cryptography to completely obscure
the images contents. Instead the ability to recover all
of the image information relied on access to a second
stream of images not a predetermined encryption key.
Only with access to the second stream is one able to re-
cover the blur kernel and finally the latent image. This
key-less decryption allows a multi-tiered security clear-
ance system to be implemented by structuring or mod-
ifying the video transmission infrastructure. We have
implemented a GPU based processing pipeline that pro-
duces deblurred video at frame rates above 20fps for
relatively large kernel sizes upto 25× 25.
Our GPU implementation of the GCD image de-
blurring algorithm has several limitations. First, our ap-
proach requires double the bandwidth for video trans-
mission and a means to restrict access to both video
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Fig. 5 Decrypted results with different deblurring methods on video frames encrypted by our coprime blurred scheme.
streams. These requirements may reduce the number
of instances where deploying our approach is practical.
The running time for our approach is proportional to
the blur kernel size and therefore the level of privacy
in some surveillance scenarios may be limited by a de-
sired frame rate. In addition the running time of the
deblurring process may prohibit some post processing
that may aid surveillance such as facial or object recog-
nition. Future work will include decreasing the running
time of expensive operations in the pipeline to facilitate
some post processing steps such as background subtrac-
tion. Reducing the running time can be achieved either
by optimizing the existing pipeline or introducing a hy-
brid pipeline. For example shifting computation of SVD
to an external FGPA or coprocessor. Another topic of
interest we may pursue is the integration of a z-camera
which will provide the algorithm with depth informa-
tion which then can be used to compute the optimal
blur kernel size for hiding information.
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